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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Since so many married men are out of the continental United States, due
primarily to service in the armed forces, a procedure is needed whereby a
serviceman's wife owning an interest in real estate may convey the same
without it being necessary that the husband assent in personm27 The
method under discussion fills that need.
A positive decision on this matter is needed in North Carolina, both
in order to cure the possible defect in titles already transferred in this
manner and so that attorneys may confidently recommend this proce-
dure to clients. Since it may take some time for a test case to reach the
Supreme Court, it remains for the legislature to fill the gap by enacting
legislation authorizing the wife to join on behalf of her husband by his
power of attorney, as was done in Florida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.2 8
This would enable a married woman, whose husband is unavailable, to
exercise the freedom of transfer which she needs should circumstances
arise which make it necessary for her to dispose of her separate interest
in real estate.29
TENcH C. CoxE, III
Torts-Emotional Distress-Negligent Infliction of Fear For
Safety of Another
The evolution of recovery for emotional disturbance has been a slow
and often illogical process. In order to observe briefly this development,
the following categories of cases involving emotional disturbance should
be considered: (1) assault on P; (2) intentional infliction of mental 'dis-
turbance on P; (3) negligence toward P; (4) intentional tort toward
another which is treated as negligence toward P; (5) negligence toward
another which also is negligence toward P. Assault, as the first stage in
this development, recognized a freedom from fear of immediate bodily
harm.' Today there is a growing recognition of the intentional infliction
of emotional distress as a tort in itself; and unlike assault, there is no
" It should be noted that N. C. GEN. STAT. § 39-8 (1943, recompiled 1950)
permits the husband to join in the deed at a different time and place from the wife,
so she may mail him the deed, requesting that he sign and mail it back. This,
however, is at best a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure.
28 See note 9, supra.
22 The practice of permitting the husband to'manifest his written assent to his
wife's conveyances through his power of attorney provides a method which gives the
wife complete freedom of transfer, if she secures her husband's power of attorney.
A more direct method, and one which would give a married woman absolute free-
dom of transfer, would be provided by eliminating the joinder requirement al-
together. In an era of substantially equal rights as between men and women in
almost every respect, such a requirement is admittedly outmoded. It is to be hoped
that the legislature will soon take the action necessary in order that the con-
stitutional provision which makes the husband's written assent mandatory be sub-
mitted to the voters for possible amendment.
'I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y. B. Lib. Ass., f. 99, pl. 60 (1348). This "hatchet"
case is considered the historical origin of assault.
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limitation to fear of immediate bodily harm.2 In these two categories
defendant's conduct is intentional, and the absence of physical conse-
quences does not preclude the recovery of damages. However, gen-
erally, in the field of negligent infliction of mental anguish, in the ab-
sence of some impact, there must be resulting physical consequences to
warrant recovery of damages.8  A majority of jurisdictions allow P to
recover for negligence which causes him mental anguish resulting in ill-
ness. 4 D's intentional tort toward another has been treated as negligence
toward P where illness followed the shock.5 As to the fifth category,
where D's negligence imperils another for whose safety P fears and
suffers mental anguish resulting in physical consequences, American
courts are hesitant to award damages.
This hesitancy is illustrated in Resavage v. Davies,0 a recent Mary-
land decision which affirmed a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. It was
alleged that plaintiff was on her front porch when she saw defendant
motorist negligently kill her two children down on the street corner.
She suffered mental anguish resulting in physical consequences. The
2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 46 (Supp. 1948). The following cases appear to hold
that mental anguish is sufficient in itself without a showing of physical illness:
Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932) ; Quina v.
Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); La Salle Extension University v.
Fagarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
Other cases seem to regard physical illness as essential to the cause of action.
See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D. C. 183, 105 F. 2d 62
(1939) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E. 825 (1936);
Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P. 2d 330 (1943).
In other cases illness resulted. See State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff,
240 P. 2d 282 (Cal. 1952) ; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 313, 216 P. 2d
571 (1950) ; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. Zd 696 (1948) ; Nickerson
v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q. B. 57(1897).
'Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938); Chiuchiluo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930) ; Lambert v.
Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924). Exceptions to the general rule
are: (1) Telegraph Cases, that is, the negligent transmission of death messages
which indicate on their face that mental anguish may result, See Telegraph
Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Mentzer v. Telegraph Co.,
93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895); Russ v. Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E.
2d 681 (1942). (2) Negligent Mishandling of Corpses. Recovery in these cases
is based on a quasi-property right in the body of a dead person. See Klumbach v.
Silver Mount Cemetery Assn. 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y. Supp. 180 (1934);
Morrow v. Cline, 211 N . C. 254, 190 S. E. 207 (1937). See also, for discussion of
quasi-property right, Note, 30 N. C. L. Rav. 299 (1952).
" Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (1931); Chiuchiolo v. New
England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 150 Ati. 540 (1930) ; Kimberly v. How-
land, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N. C.
536, 42 S. E. 983 (1902); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 313, 436 (1934).
I 'Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890), Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A
Milepost in the Law, 12 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Martin v. Spencer, 221 N. C.
28, 18 S. E. 2d 703 (1942) ; Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S. W. 2d 811 (Tex. Civ. A pp.
1929); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924). See also
Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916), which presents the theory of
"transferred intent" rather than negligence.0 86 A. 2d 879 (Md. 1952).
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court declared there was no duty to plaintiff and consequently no negli-
gence since she herself was in no immediate peril.
Those courts allowing recovery for the physical consequences of
"fear for the safety of another" negligently imperiled, do so on the theory
of negligence toward the plaintiff. Another Maryland case7 allowed
damages for a father's fear for his children and fear for himself. How-
ever, the fact that he himself was imperiled was the basis for the duty to
him. Therefore, damages may be awarded against a negligent dlefendant
for "fear for the safety of another" when there is "fear for self" at the
same time." "There is neither logic nor reason to hold... that a distinc-
tion is to be taken so that, if a party suffer an injury, as loss of health, of
mind, or of life, through fear of safety for self, a recovery may be had for
the negligent act of another; but may not recover under similar cir-
cumstances, if the fear be of safety for another 9
In the above cases "fear for self" might be regarded as a peg for
recovery for "fear for the safety of another", that is, a basis for establish-
ing negligence toward the plaintiff.'0 "It is predicted that if we require
the plaintiff to be in danger of ... fear for his own safety, many courts
will be equally quick to find these elements."' ' It seems that this ele-
ment of constructive peril for self was found in Webb v. Lewald Coal
Co.,' 2 where plaintiff was on the second floor of a building when de-
fendant's vehicle ran into the ground floor underneath her. She suffered
mental anguish and testified that she "felt sure he [the driver] would be
killed." The court inferred a "fear for oneself" and allowed recovery
rather than order a new trial so that upon cross examination, the jury
might 'determine whether she actually feared for herself.
Hanmbrook v. Stokes Bros.'3 is the leading case for the proposition
that one might recover purely on the grounds of "fear for the safety of
another". A mother on the sidewalk saw a driverless truck running
away due to defendant's negligence. Realizing it had come from the
direction her children were traveling, she turned back and ran uphill to
the scene of the accident. From there she went to the hospital, and the
shock of seeing her child in a critical condition caused her subsequent
" Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933). ("... . the nervous
shock or fright sustained by the plaintiff was based on reasonable grounds for ap-
prehension of an injury to the plaintiff and his children.").8 Id., accord, Webb v. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918).
'Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 401, 165 Atl. 182, 183 (1933).
" An analogy may be drawn between this peg and the outmoded and forsaken
peg of impact, which in the past served as a basis for allowing recovery for "fear
for self".
" Hallen, Damages For Physical Injuries Resulting From Fright or Shock,
19 VA. L. Rtv. 253, 271 (1933), quoted in, Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232,
240, 280 N. W. 890, 893 (1938).
. 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931).
18 1 K. B. 141 (1925).
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miscarriage and death. The King's Bench Division ordered a new trial
on the grounds that it was not necessary for the jury to determine that
the mother's shock was produced by fear for herself. Thereby a cause
of action was established against a negligent defendant for "fear for
another's safety". Although it may be argued that the plaintiff in this
case was in possible danger to herself, this was not the opinion of the
dissent nor was there any mention of "fear for one's own safety" ex-
cept to say that it was unnecessary. Also, in other cases in accord, 14
plaintiff could not possibly have been subjected to the same danger as
the one for whom she feared.
The courts which allow recovery for "fear for the safety of another"
impose certain limitations. Who may recover-a parent, child, spouse,
or total stranger? In all the cases cited with the exception of two,15
the plaintiff was a parent. The Restatement of Torts seemingly would
limit recovery to parents and spouses.16 Recovery beyond immediate
relatives would be an unreasonable extension of duty.' 7 When may
one recover-when he hears about the accident from others or hears or
sees it himself ? The cases cited limit recovery to seeing the peril or, as
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. put it, ..... that the shock resulted from what
the plaintiff's wife either saw or realized by her own unaided senses, and
not from something which some one told her. .. ".18s Such witnessing
or seeing must be simultaneous with the accident or peril and not several
hours later. As to how serious the peril or accident must be there is
no judicial authority.19 Clearly it should be such that plaintiff as a
reasonable person would suffer mental anguish.
North Carolina has yet to decide whether there is a cause of action
for "fear for the safety of another" based on 'defendant's negligent con-
duct. It is hoped that once confronted with the situation of the principal
14 Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938) ; Cohn v. Ansonia
Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1914). In these cases since
there was no mention of "fear for self" and there was no apparent danger of di-
rect physical harm, there is an inference that the duty to plaintiff was not to sub-
ject her to the mental anguish and resulting illness which she suffered. Compare
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. with Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912) ; Alabama Fuel Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916),
although D's conduct was intentional, it was negligent toward the one for whom
P feared.
15Webb v. Lewald Coal Co.. 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931) (Fear for a
stranger. The case was decided on the basis of "fear for self".) ; Rasmussen v.
Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938) (A business man's fear for safety
of customers.).2' RESTATENT, TORTS § 313, Caveat (1934).
17 Several states, by statute in wrongful death actions, allow recovery to a close
relative for the relative's own mental anguish as distinguished from that possibly
suffered by the deceased. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1941) ; LA. R-v. STAT. art.
2315 (West 1952) (note 324) ; S. C. CODF ANN. § 412 (1942) ; VA. CoDs ANN.
§ 8-636 (1950) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5475 (1949).
18 1 K. B. 141, 152 (1925).
"
9See note 17 supra.
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case involving a parent seeing the negligent killing of her children, our
court will allow recovery for such mental anguish and resulting illness
of the parent.
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM
Torts-Independent Tort Feasors-Joint and Several Liability
A recent Texas decision1 has evidenced once again the difficulty
'Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex.
1952).
which has faced the court over the years in deciding whether the acts
of two or more wrongdoers are such as to make them jointly and sever-
ally liable for the damages resulting from their combined acts. There
A, an oil company, and B, a salt water disposal company, negligently
permitted their respective pipe lines, running adjacent to plaintiff's land,
to break on or about the same day. Salt water from B's pipes and a
salt water-oil mixture from A's pipes flowed into a stream, thence emp-
tying into plaintiff's fishing lake, killing the fish and causing other
damage. The court held the two companies liable jointly and severally
as joint tort feasors although there had been no unity of purpose or de-
sign, and each had acted independently in conducting its business.
The cases presenting the problem of joint and several liability may
be analyzed into two major categories: (1) Where the acts of two or
more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harmful result, the act
of one being in itself insufficient to produce the injury, and (2) Where
the acts of two or more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harm-
ful result, the act of one alone being sufficient to produce the injury.
The general rule applied to factual situations typifying the first cate-
gory is that causes of action arising from the acts of independent tort
feasors each of which inflicts some lamage, absent concert of action and
common intent, create no joint and several liability but each is responsi-
ble only for that portion of the injuries due to his negligence. 2
_ Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P. 2d 165 (1952) ; Miller v. Highland
Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 (1891); Symmes v. Pebble Phosphate Co.,
66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913) ; Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N. W.
1000 (1891) ; Garret v. Garret, 228 N. C. 530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948) ; Rice v.
McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774 (1908) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ.
App. 349 (1908).
With the exception of Kansas3 and Oklahoma,4 this rule has been
'Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F. 2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
667 (1931). McDaniel v. Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913).
'Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P. 2d 389 (1931) (and cases
cited therein).
most frequently applied by all jurisdietions in the pollution, diversion,
obstruction, or flooding of a stream by various independent proprietors, 5
Veryheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 Pac. 1116 (1915) (flooding of prop-
erty) ; Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 248 S. W. 227 (1923) ; Simmons
v. Everson, 124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891) ; Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
41 N. D. 316, 171 N. W. 632 (1918) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 349
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